Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Divorce, Inheritance, Inheritance, Property, Property
Judges: Aldridge JBryant CJRyan J
Background: The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Western Australia heard an Appeal by a husband who argued that an inheritance received 4 years after separation should not be included in the property to be divided between him and his ex-wife. The parties were married for 8 years and were divorced in 2011.They had one child who was 5 years old at the time of separation. In 2014 the husband received an inheritance from his father’s estate. The wife commenced proceedings more than 3 years after separation and was granted the Court’s leave under Section 44 (3) of the Family Law Act to pursue a property settlement claim.
[Legal Issue]The central issue on appeal was whether the trial Judge erred by including the husband’s post separation inheritance within the parties’ property pool available for division. The husband argued that his inheritance should not be included in the pool because of the degree of “connection” or more to the point, the lack of connection, between the inheritance and the parties’ matrimonial relationship. The husband was unsuccessful in taking that position and his appeal was dismissed.
The Justices of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, Chief Justice Bryant, Justice Ryan and Justice Aldridge concluded that the Court retained a discretion as to how to approach the treatment of property acquired after separation.
Conversely in the case of Holland & Holland [2017] FamC
[Court Orders](1) The appeal against the orders made by Magistrate Calverley on 17 November 2016 is dismissed.
(2) The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or in default of agreement as assessed.
The husband was unsuccessful in excluding his post-separation inheritance from the asset pool. The trial judge assessed contributions as 65%/35% in the husband’s favour, which included a 10% adjustment to the wife for future needs.
No appealable error established – Appeal dismissed
Catchwords: Divorce, Inheritance, Inheritance, Property, Property
Judges: Aldridge JBryant CJRyan J
Background: The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Western Australia heard an Appeal by a husband who argued that an inheritance received 4 years after separation should not be included in the property to be divided between him and his ex-wife. The parties were married for 8 years and were divorced in 2011.They had one child who was 5 years old at the time of separation. In 2014 the husband received an inheritance from his father’s estate. The wife commenced proceedings more than 3 years after separation and was granted the Court’s leave under Section 44 (3) of the Family Law Act to pursue a property settlement claim.
[Legal Issue]The central issue on appeal was whether the trial Judge erred by including the husband’s post separation inheritance within the parties’ property pool available for division. The husband argued that his inheritance should not be included in the pool because of the degree of “connection” or more to the point, the lack of connection, between the inheritance and the parties’ matrimonial relationship. The husband was unsuccessful in taking that position and his appeal was dismissed.
The Justices of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, Chief Justice Bryant, Justice Ryan and Justice Aldridge concluded that the Court retained a discretion as to how to approach the treatment of property acquired after separation.
Conversely in the case of Holland & Holland [2017] FamC
[Court Orders](1) The appeal against the orders made by Magistrate Calverley on 17 November 2016 is dismissed.
(2) The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or in default of agreement as assessed.
The husband was unsuccessful in excluding his post-separation inheritance from the asset pool. The trial judge assessed contributions as 65%/35% in the husband’s favour, which included a 10% adjustment to the wife for future needs.
No appealable error established – Appeal dismissed
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Child Support, Departure Determination, extra-curricular activities, School Fees, Sole Parental Responsibility
Judges: Aldridge JBryant CJChief Justice Diana BryantCoates JJustice Michael KentJustice Murray AldridgeJustice Stephen CoatesKent J
Background: A divorced mother, known by her court appointed pseudonym as Ms Stewart, has sought an Order from the Court that her two children, one boy and one girl, upon reaching high school age, should be enrolled in two prestigious same-sex private schools, the son of which to follow in the father's family tradition, she claimed, and attend the father's and grandfather's alma mater. As the Federal Circuit Court heard the previous year prior the case being appealed to the Full Court of the Family Court, the estimated cost of the tuition fees alone, if both children attended private school, would be approximately $50,000 a year. The Court further heard that even without taking into account the extra expenses of a private education and probable fee increases, it would cost up to $300,000 in total to
[Legal Issue]In the original decision from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Justice Stephen Coates relied on the mother's financial capacity in determining as to whether this case had any merit, and consequently found that Ms Stewart had not established that the cost of private schooling would be affordable.
"The mother said she could afford 40 per cent of the fees, yet on her income, I do not see she has proven her case," he said.
He ruled that the children should attend a government high school, saying they would not be disadvantaged as the state provides "a capable education system".
The judge said the Stewarts' son would cope with not going to the private school "if the mother responsibly handles the situation for the child, even though such an order would be a great disappointment
[Court Orders](1) The application in an appeal filed by the appellant mother on 21 February 2017 is dismissed.
(2) The appeal is dismissed.
(3) The appellant mother pay the respondent father’s costs of and incidental to the appeal to be agreed, or failing agreement, to be assessed.
Catchwords: Appeal, Child Support, Departure Determination, extra-curricular activities, School Fees, Sole Parental Responsibility
Judges: Aldridge JBryant CJChief Justice Diana BryantCoates JJustice Michael KentJustice Murray AldridgeJustice Stephen CoatesKent J
Background: A divorced mother, known by her court appointed pseudonym as Ms Stewart, has sought an Order from the Court that her two children, one boy and one girl, upon reaching high school age, should be enrolled in two prestigious same-sex private schools, the son of which to follow in the father's family tradition, she claimed, and attend the father's and grandfather's alma mater. As the Federal Circuit Court heard the previous year prior the case being appealed to the Full Court of the Family Court, the estimated cost of the tuition fees alone, if both children attended private school, would be approximately $50,000 a year. The Court further heard that even without taking into account the extra expenses of a private education and probable fee increases, it would cost up to $300,000 in total to
[Legal Issue]In the original decision from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Justice Stephen Coates relied on the mother's financial capacity in determining as to whether this case had any merit, and consequently found that Ms Stewart had not established that the cost of private schooling would be affordable.
"The mother said she could afford 40 per cent of the fees, yet on her income, I do not see she has proven her case," he said.
He ruled that the children should attend a government high school, saying they would not be disadvantaged as the state provides "a capable education system".
The judge said the Stewarts' son would cope with not going to the private school "if the mother responsibly handles the situation for the child, even though such an order would be a great disappointment
[Court Orders](1) The application in an appeal filed by the appellant mother on 21 February 2017 is dismissed.
(2) The appeal is dismissed.
(3) The appellant mother pay the respondent father’s costs of and incidental to the appeal to be agreed, or failing agreement, to be assessed.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Post-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Aldridge JCronin JStrickland J
Background: The parties met over the internet in early to mid-2006. She was a 36 year old, born and living overseas with limited English skills. She was previously divorced, had no children and no assets of substance. He was a 67 year old, was a property developer and worth approximately $18 to $24 million. He was divorced from his first wife, with whom he had three children, now all in adulthood. Having met on a dating website in early to mid-2006, the parties then commenced speaking with each other on the telephone. They spoke in English and in (language omitted). The applicant agreed that the deceased said to her: “I will come to (country omitted) and we will see if we like each other. If I like you I will marry you but you will have to sign paper. My money is for my children.”
[Legal Issue]The Federal Circuit Court initially set aside the agreements, finding that they were signed “under duress born of inequality of bargaining power where there was no outcome to her that was fair and reasonable”.
However, the Full Family Court ruled the agreements were binding, and said there had not been duress, undue influence or unconscionable conduct on the husband’s part.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Catchwords: Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Post-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Aldridge JCronin JStrickland J
Background: The parties met over the internet in early to mid-2006. She was a 36 year old, born and living overseas with limited English skills. She was previously divorced, had no children and no assets of substance. He was a 67 year old, was a property developer and worth approximately $18 to $24 million. He was divorced from his first wife, with whom he had three children, now all in adulthood. Having met on a dating website in early to mid-2006, the parties then commenced speaking with each other on the telephone. They spoke in English and in (language omitted). The applicant agreed that the deceased said to her: “I will come to (country omitted) and we will see if we like each other. If I like you I will marry you but you will have to sign paper. My money is for my children.”
[Legal Issue]The Federal Circuit Court initially set aside the agreements, finding that they were signed “under duress born of inequality of bargaining power where there was no outcome to her that was fair and reasonable”.
However, the Full Family Court ruled the agreements were binding, and said there had not been duress, undue influence or unconscionable conduct on the husband’s part.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Child Support, Departure Determination
Judges: May JStrickland JThackray CJ
Background: The appellant father in this case sought a review of a child support departure determination and a subsequent Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision which both determined an increased taxable income for child support purposes. The father’s appeal to the Federal Circuit Court on this matter was dismissed and the father now seeks to appeal that decision.
[Legal Issue]This was an application for leave to appeal from the dismissal of an appeal from the Social Security Appeals Tribunal which increased the appellant’s taxable income for child support purposes. The application was dismissed with costs. In its judgment, the court analysed and determined a number of significant questions of law arising out of the interpretation of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) which would be of interest to family law specialists.
[Court Orders]The appeal application was dismissed. The Court found no error in law by failing to refer to s 117(7A) of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth).
No issue of procedural fairness arises – Application for leave to appeal dismissed – Appellant father ordered to pay costs.
Catchwords: Appeal, Child Support, Departure Determination
Judges: May JStrickland JThackray CJ
Background: The appellant father in this case sought a review of a child support departure determination and a subsequent Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision which both determined an increased taxable income for child support purposes. The father’s appeal to the Federal Circuit Court on this matter was dismissed and the father now seeks to appeal that decision.
[Legal Issue]This was an application for leave to appeal from the dismissal of an appeal from the Social Security Appeals Tribunal which increased the appellant’s taxable income for child support purposes. The application was dismissed with costs. In its judgment, the court analysed and determined a number of significant questions of law arising out of the interpretation of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) which would be of interest to family law specialists.
[Court Orders]The appeal application was dismissed. The Court found no error in law by failing to refer to s 117(7A) of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth).
No issue of procedural fairness arises – Application for leave to appeal dismissed – Appellant father ordered to pay costs.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Gender Identity Dysphoria
Judges: Bryant CJFinn JStrickland J
Background: The child concerned, “Jamie”, aged almost 11 years at the time of hearing, was diagnosed as having childhood gender identity disorder. At first instance, the parents were asking the court to authorise them to consent to treatment on behalf of Jamie, under the guidance of Jamie’s treating medical practitioners, for the administration of particular drugs designed to achieve suppression of certain hormones affecting the development of male features and particularly the onset of male puberty. The treatment, which occurs in two stages, comprises administration of puberty-suppressant hormones (stage one) and oestrogen (stage two), and is common to children who are diagnosed with this condition. The treatment would enable Jamie, born a male, to live in her affirmed sex as a female.
[Legal Issue]The first ground asserts that childhood gender identity disorder is not a special medical procedure which displaces the parental responsibility of the Appellants to decide upon the appropriate treatment for their child.
The second ground, in the alternative, asserts that the Applicant Mother and Applicant Father be authorised to consent to the following special medical procedures on behalf of their child, ... (“Jamie”), being (i) he administration of puberty suppressant hormones, and (ii) additional treatment of oestrogen as may be considered appropriate by Jamie’s treating Endocrinologist.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Order 1 of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Dessau on 28 March 2011 be set aside.
There be no order for costs.
Catchwords: Appeal, Gender Identity Dysphoria
Judges: Bryant CJFinn JStrickland J
Background: The child concerned, “Jamie”, aged almost 11 years at the time of hearing, was diagnosed as having childhood gender identity disorder. At first instance, the parents were asking the court to authorise them to consent to treatment on behalf of Jamie, under the guidance of Jamie’s treating medical practitioners, for the administration of particular drugs designed to achieve suppression of certain hormones affecting the development of male features and particularly the onset of male puberty. The treatment, which occurs in two stages, comprises administration of puberty-suppressant hormones (stage one) and oestrogen (stage two), and is common to children who are diagnosed with this condition. The treatment would enable Jamie, born a male, to live in her affirmed sex as a female.
[Legal Issue]The first ground asserts that childhood gender identity disorder is not a special medical procedure which displaces the parental responsibility of the Appellants to decide upon the appropriate treatment for their child.
The second ground, in the alternative, asserts that the Applicant Mother and Applicant Father be authorised to consent to the following special medical procedures on behalf of their child, ... (“Jamie”), being (i) he administration of puberty suppressant hormones, and (ii) additional treatment of oestrogen as may be considered appropriate by Jamie’s treating Endocrinologist.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Order 1 of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Dessau on 28 March 2011 be set aside.
There be no order for costs.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Finn JRyan JStrickland J
Background: A couple, known by the court as Mr Wallace and Ms Stelzer, met in 1998 at the Sydney club where Ms Stelzer worked soon after Mr Wallace split from his first wife. At the time, he was 51 and she was 38. They married seven years later and entered into a prenuptial agreement that Mr Wallace would pay Ms Stelzer $3.25m if the relationship failed within four years. It failed within two.
[Legal Issue]Mr Wallace tried to renege on their pre-nuptial (binding financial) agreement, arguing that the relevant legislation was unconstitutional because it was retrospective. He argued that his pre-nuptial agreement was signed before the 2010 amendments and so his agreement should be deemed invalid.
Mr Wallace also fought to have the pre-nuptial agreement deemed invalid, claiming that Ms Stelzer behaved fraudulently by making "false promises of love and desire for children".
He also said his lawyers did not give him adequate legal advice and make clear the pros and cons of the pre-nuptial agreement. He said that his lawyers had taken only minutes to sign it.
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court ruled the pre-nuptial agreement was binding and that the amended legislation "can have a retrospective operation which is constitutionally valid".
The woman who previously worked as a pole dancer is set to receive $3.25 million from her ex-husband after the Family Court ruled against his bid to have their pre-nuptial agreement overturned because of her "false promises".
The ruling means that there is much more certainty about the validity of pre-nuptial a
Catchwords: Appeal, Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Finn JRyan JStrickland J
Background: A couple, known by the court as Mr Wallace and Ms Stelzer, met in 1998 at the Sydney club where Ms Stelzer worked soon after Mr Wallace split from his first wife. At the time, he was 51 and she was 38. They married seven years later and entered into a prenuptial agreement that Mr Wallace would pay Ms Stelzer $3.25m if the relationship failed within four years. It failed within two.
[Legal Issue]Mr Wallace tried to renege on their pre-nuptial (binding financial) agreement, arguing that the relevant legislation was unconstitutional because it was retrospective. He argued that his pre-nuptial agreement was signed before the 2010 amendments and so his agreement should be deemed invalid.
Mr Wallace also fought to have the pre-nuptial agreement deemed invalid, claiming that Ms Stelzer behaved fraudulently by making "false promises of love and desire for children".
He also said his lawyers did not give him adequate legal advice and make clear the pros and cons of the pre-nuptial agreement. He said that his lawyers had taken only minutes to sign it.
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court ruled the pre-nuptial agreement was binding and that the amended legislation "can have a retrospective operation which is constitutionally valid".
The woman who previously worked as a pole dancer is set to receive $3.25 million from her ex-husband after the Family Court ruled against his bid to have their pre-nuptial agreement overturned because of her "false promises".
The ruling means that there is much more certainty about the validity of pre-nuptial a
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Notice to Appeal, Spousal Maintenance
Judges: Strickland J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Catchwords: Notice to Appeal, Spousal Maintenance
Judges: Strickland J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Children
Judges: Bryant CJColeman JMay J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Catchwords: Appeal, Children
Judges: Bryant CJColeman JMay J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Amicus Curiae, Children, Medical, Parental Responsibility, Premature Infants, Special Medical Procedure
Judges: Young J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]The judge concluded that any treatment decision was up to baby D’s parents in conjunction with the doctors, and that no criminal sanctions would apply if death came as a result. As a result, Baby D’s parents are permitted to authorise the removal of the child's ventilation tube, leading to the child's death.
Catchwords: Amicus Curiae, Children, Medical, Parental Responsibility, Premature Infants, Special Medical Procedure
Judges: Young J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]The judge concluded that any treatment decision was up to baby D’s parents in conjunction with the doctors, and that no criminal sanctions would apply if death came as a result. As a result, Baby D’s parents are permitted to authorise the removal of the child's ventilation tube, leading to the child's death.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Biological Mother, Birth Mother, Contravention, Meaningful Relationship, Non-Parent, Parentage, Parental, Parental Rights, Parenting Orders, Relocation, Same Sex Parents, Same Sex Relationship, Step Parent
Judges: Coleman JJarrett FMMay JWarnick J
Background: Two women had lived in an intimate relationship for 9 years and two children were born during this time using IVF, with each woman being the biological parent of one child (same sex relationship). One woman then left the relationship taking her birth child with her. Orders were issued for the two children to spend significant time with the other woman and to see their sibling. One woman then relocated further away making the order impractical and the other woman appealed arguing that the first woman was not facilitating an ongoing meaningful relationship between her and the child whom she considered that she had parented.
[Legal Issue]Each woman claimed to be a parent of the other’s child, although the trial judge found to the contrary as only a biological parent or an adoptive parent meets the legal definition of being a parent. Both women submitted that each child regarded each of the women as a mother.
The Appeal Court found that if a child is born by an artificial conception procedure while the woman is married to a man and the procedure is carried out with the joint consent of both adults, then the child is their child for the purposes of the Act, or both the woman and man are parents of the child.
The Appeal Court supported the ruling by the trial judge that the women were not parents of the child whom they did not give birth to (non-parent). The appeal was dismissed.
[Court Orders]The Appeal Court supported the ruling by the trial judge that the women were not parents of the child whom they did not give birth to (non-parent).
The appeal was dismissed.
Catchwords: Appeal, Biological Mother, Birth Mother, Contravention, Meaningful Relationship, Non-Parent, Parentage, Parental, Parental Rights, Parenting Orders, Relocation, Same Sex Parents, Same Sex Relationship, Step Parent
Judges: Coleman JJarrett FMMay JWarnick J
Background: Two women had lived in an intimate relationship for 9 years and two children were born during this time using IVF, with each woman being the biological parent of one child (same sex relationship). One woman then left the relationship taking her birth child with her. Orders were issued for the two children to spend significant time with the other woman and to see their sibling. One woman then relocated further away making the order impractical and the other woman appealed arguing that the first woman was not facilitating an ongoing meaningful relationship between her and the child whom she considered that she had parented.
[Legal Issue]Each woman claimed to be a parent of the other’s child, although the trial judge found to the contrary as only a biological parent or an adoptive parent meets the legal definition of being a parent. Both women submitted that each child regarded each of the women as a mother.
The Appeal Court found that if a child is born by an artificial conception procedure while the woman is married to a man and the procedure is carried out with the joint consent of both adults, then the child is their child for the purposes of the Act, or both the woman and man are parents of the child.
The Appeal Court supported the ruling by the trial judge that the women were not parents of the child whom they did not give birth to (non-parent). The appeal was dismissed.
[Court Orders]The Appeal Court supported the ruling by the trial judge that the women were not parents of the child whom they did not give birth to (non-parent).
The appeal was dismissed.