Gummow J
Court or Tribunal: High Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Post-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Bell JEdelman JGageler JGordon JKeane JKiefel CJNettle J
Background: He was a multi-millionaire property developer, she was his much younger Eastern European bride who spoke little English. The couple met online in 2006 on a “website for potential brides” when the husband was 67 and she was 36. The husband, known as Mr Kennedy, had assets of at least $18 million. He was divorced from his first wife and had three adult children. Soon after he met the wife online, he told her that if they married, “you will have to sign paper. My money is for my children.” The agreement said the wife was to receive a total payment of $50,000 adjusted for inflation in the event of separation after at least three years of marriage. It also provided for the wife to receive a penthouse worth up to $1.5m, a Mercedes and continuing income, in the event the husband die
[Legal Issue]The Federal Circuit Court initially set aside the agreements, finding that they were signed “under duress born of inequality of bargaining power where there was no outcome to her that was fair and reasonable”.
However, the Full Family Court ruled the agreements were binding, and said there had not been duress, undue influence or unconscionable conduct on the husband’s part.
The High Court disagreed. It said the primary judge’s conclusion of undue influence was open on the evidence and it was unnecessary to decide whether the agreements could have also been set aside for duress.
The case will now be sent back for the Federal Circuit Court to decide how the property pool should be divided between the two.
Ms Thorne is seeking orders for a further $1.1 million plus a lump
[Court Orders]1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia made on 26 September 2016 and, in their place, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.
3.The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.
Catchwords: Appeal, Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Post-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Bell JEdelman JGageler JGordon JKeane JKiefel CJNettle J
Background: He was a multi-millionaire property developer, she was his much younger Eastern European bride who spoke little English. The couple met online in 2006 on a “website for potential brides” when the husband was 67 and she was 36. The husband, known as Mr Kennedy, had assets of at least $18 million. He was divorced from his first wife and had three adult children. Soon after he met the wife online, he told her that if they married, “you will have to sign paper. My money is for my children.” The agreement said the wife was to receive a total payment of $50,000 adjusted for inflation in the event of separation after at least three years of marriage. It also provided for the wife to receive a penthouse worth up to $1.5m, a Mercedes and continuing income, in the event the husband die
[Legal Issue]The Federal Circuit Court initially set aside the agreements, finding that they were signed “under duress born of inequality of bargaining power where there was no outcome to her that was fair and reasonable”.
However, the Full Family Court ruled the agreements were binding, and said there had not been duress, undue influence or unconscionable conduct on the husband’s part.
The High Court disagreed. It said the primary judge’s conclusion of undue influence was open on the evidence and it was unnecessary to decide whether the agreements could have also been set aside for duress.
The case will now be sent back for the Federal Circuit Court to decide how the property pool should be divided between the two.
Ms Thorne is seeking orders for a further $1.1 million plus a lump
[Court Orders]1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia made on 26 September 2016 and, in their place, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.
3.The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.
Court or Tribunal: Supreme Court of Queensland
Catchwords: Estate Planning, Estoppel by Conduct, Family Provision, Family Provision, Family Trust, Family Trust, High Value Estates, Large Estate, Requirement of Adequate Maintenance, Succession, Succession, Wills
Judges: Martin J
Background: Steven Darveniza, the eldest son of Bojan Darveniza, took his father’s widow to the Supreme Court to get a share of the estate, claiming he had worked for his father for many years. Bojan Darveniza died in 2010, aged 78, leaving most of his estate to his second wife, Xiao Hong Darveniza, now known as Jane, who was 30 years younger than him. Multi-millionaire Bojan Darveniza was a hardworking, astute investor with a talent for turning run-down properties into rental goldmines, amassing a fortune. But to his older children, Bojan was a tyrant who ruled them with an iron rod, making them work hard in the family business after school and on weekends. Bojan had eight children – Steven and Tania with first wife Lindsay; Natasha, Jonathon and Andrea with his ex-housekeeper de fact
[Legal Issue]This case involves an examination of the familial and financial relationships of the Darveniza family. Steven Darveniza has brought two matters before the Court. In the first he seeks an order for provision (pursuant to s 41 of the Succession Act 1981) from the estate of his deceased father, Bojan Darveniza (“the provision claim”). In the second, he seeks declarations about, and transfers of interests in, a number of family companies (“the trust claim”). He also seeks damages pursuant to s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and consequential orders (“the company claim”).
[Court Orders]Bojan’s personal estate was worth $40 million at the time of his death, but the net value was now between $26 and $28 million, the court heard.
Justice Martin said Steven deserved better provision from his father’s very large estate because he had worked long and hard for Bojan, contributing to the growth of his property interests.
Two reasons for his father not providing for him in his will were misconceived or based on a misunderstanding, the judge said.
He also accepted Steven co
Catchwords: Estate Planning, Estoppel by Conduct, Family Provision, Family Provision, Family Trust, Family Trust, High Value Estates, Large Estate, Requirement of Adequate Maintenance, Succession, Succession, Wills
Judges: Martin J
Background: Steven Darveniza, the eldest son of Bojan Darveniza, took his father’s widow to the Supreme Court to get a share of the estate, claiming he had worked for his father for many years. Bojan Darveniza died in 2010, aged 78, leaving most of his estate to his second wife, Xiao Hong Darveniza, now known as Jane, who was 30 years younger than him. Multi-millionaire Bojan Darveniza was a hardworking, astute investor with a talent for turning run-down properties into rental goldmines, amassing a fortune. But to his older children, Bojan was a tyrant who ruled them with an iron rod, making them work hard in the family business after school and on weekends. Bojan had eight children – Steven and Tania with first wife Lindsay; Natasha, Jonathon and Andrea with his ex-housekeeper de fact
[Legal Issue]This case involves an examination of the familial and financial relationships of the Darveniza family. Steven Darveniza has brought two matters before the Court. In the first he seeks an order for provision (pursuant to s 41 of the Succession Act 1981) from the estate of his deceased father, Bojan Darveniza (“the provision claim”). In the second, he seeks declarations about, and transfers of interests in, a number of family companies (“the trust claim”). He also seeks damages pursuant to s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and consequential orders (“the company claim”).
[Court Orders]Bojan’s personal estate was worth $40 million at the time of his death, but the net value was now between $26 and $28 million, the court heard.
Justice Martin said Steven deserved better provision from his father’s very large estate because he had worked long and hard for Bojan, contributing to the growth of his property interests.
Two reasons for his father not providing for him in his will were misconceived or based on a misunderstanding, the judge said.
He also accepted Steven co
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Biological Mother, Birth Mother, Contravention, Meaningful Relationship, Non-Parent, Parentage, Parental, Parental Rights, Parenting Orders, Relocation, Same Sex Parents, Same Sex Relationship, Step Parent
Judges: Coleman JJarrett FMMay JWarnick J
Background: Two women had lived in an intimate relationship for 9 years and two children were born during this time using IVF, with each woman being the biological parent of one child (same sex relationship). One woman then left the relationship taking her birth child with her. Orders were issued for the two children to spend significant time with the other woman and to see their sibling. One woman then relocated further away making the order impractical and the other woman appealed arguing that the first woman was not facilitating an ongoing meaningful relationship between her and the child whom she considered that she had parented.
[Legal Issue]Each woman claimed to be a parent of the other’s child, although the trial judge found to the contrary as only a biological parent or an adoptive parent meets the legal definition of being a parent. Both women submitted that each child regarded each of the women as a mother.
The Appeal Court found that if a child is born by an artificial conception procedure while the woman is married to a man and the procedure is carried out with the joint consent of both adults, then the child is their child for the purposes of the Act, or both the woman and man are parents of the child.
The Appeal Court supported the ruling by the trial judge that the women were not parents of the child whom they did not give birth to (non-parent). The appeal was dismissed.
[Court Orders]The Appeal Court supported the ruling by the trial judge that the women were not parents of the child whom they did not give birth to (non-parent).
The appeal was dismissed.
Catchwords: Appeal, Biological Mother, Birth Mother, Contravention, Meaningful Relationship, Non-Parent, Parentage, Parental, Parental Rights, Parenting Orders, Relocation, Same Sex Parents, Same Sex Relationship, Step Parent
Judges: Coleman JJarrett FMMay JWarnick J
Background: Two women had lived in an intimate relationship for 9 years and two children were born during this time using IVF, with each woman being the biological parent of one child (same sex relationship). One woman then left the relationship taking her birth child with her. Orders were issued for the two children to spend significant time with the other woman and to see their sibling. One woman then relocated further away making the order impractical and the other woman appealed arguing that the first woman was not facilitating an ongoing meaningful relationship between her and the child whom she considered that she had parented.
[Legal Issue]Each woman claimed to be a parent of the other’s child, although the trial judge found to the contrary as only a biological parent or an adoptive parent meets the legal definition of being a parent. Both women submitted that each child regarded each of the women as a mother.
The Appeal Court found that if a child is born by an artificial conception procedure while the woman is married to a man and the procedure is carried out with the joint consent of both adults, then the child is their child for the purposes of the Act, or both the woman and man are parents of the child.
The Appeal Court supported the ruling by the trial judge that the women were not parents of the child whom they did not give birth to (non-parent). The appeal was dismissed.
[Court Orders]The Appeal Court supported the ruling by the trial judge that the women were not parents of the child whom they did not give birth to (non-parent).
The appeal was dismissed.