Strickland J
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Post-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Aldridge JCronin JStrickland J
Background: The parties met over the internet in early to mid-2006. She was a 36 year old, born and living overseas with limited English skills. She was previously divorced, had no children and no assets of substance. He was a 67 year old, was a property developer and worth approximately $18 to $24 million. He was divorced from his first wife, with whom he had three children, now all in adulthood. Having met on a dating website in early to mid-2006, the parties then commenced speaking with each other on the telephone. They spoke in English and in (language omitted). The applicant agreed that the deceased said to her: “I will come to (country omitted) and we will see if we like each other. If I like you I will marry you but you will have to sign paper. My money is for my children.”
[Legal Issue]The Federal Circuit Court initially set aside the agreements, finding that they were signed “under duress born of inequality of bargaining power where there was no outcome to her that was fair and reasonable”.
However, the Full Family Court ruled the agreements were binding, and said there had not been duress, undue influence or unconscionable conduct on the husband’s part.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Catchwords: Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Post-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Aldridge JCronin JStrickland J
Background: The parties met over the internet in early to mid-2006. She was a 36 year old, born and living overseas with limited English skills. She was previously divorced, had no children and no assets of substance. He was a 67 year old, was a property developer and worth approximately $18 to $24 million. He was divorced from his first wife, with whom he had three children, now all in adulthood. Having met on a dating website in early to mid-2006, the parties then commenced speaking with each other on the telephone. They spoke in English and in (language omitted). The applicant agreed that the deceased said to her: “I will come to (country omitted) and we will see if we like each other. If I like you I will marry you but you will have to sign paper. My money is for my children.”
[Legal Issue]The Federal Circuit Court initially set aside the agreements, finding that they were signed “under duress born of inequality of bargaining power where there was no outcome to her that was fair and reasonable”.
However, the Full Family Court ruled the agreements were binding, and said there had not been duress, undue influence or unconscionable conduct on the husband’s part.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Child Support, Departure Determination
Judges: May JStrickland JThackray CJ
Background: The appellant father in this case sought a review of a child support departure determination and a subsequent Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision which both determined an increased taxable income for child support purposes. The father’s appeal to the Federal Circuit Court on this matter was dismissed and the father now seeks to appeal that decision.
[Legal Issue]This was an application for leave to appeal from the dismissal of an appeal from the Social Security Appeals Tribunal which increased the appellant’s taxable income for child support purposes. The application was dismissed with costs. In its judgment, the court analysed and determined a number of significant questions of law arising out of the interpretation of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) which would be of interest to family law specialists.
[Court Orders]The appeal application was dismissed. The Court found no error in law by failing to refer to s 117(7A) of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth).
No issue of procedural fairness arises – Application for leave to appeal dismissed – Appellant father ordered to pay costs.
Catchwords: Appeal, Child Support, Departure Determination
Judges: May JStrickland JThackray CJ
Background: The appellant father in this case sought a review of a child support departure determination and a subsequent Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision which both determined an increased taxable income for child support purposes. The father’s appeal to the Federal Circuit Court on this matter was dismissed and the father now seeks to appeal that decision.
[Legal Issue]This was an application for leave to appeal from the dismissal of an appeal from the Social Security Appeals Tribunal which increased the appellant’s taxable income for child support purposes. The application was dismissed with costs. In its judgment, the court analysed and determined a number of significant questions of law arising out of the interpretation of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) which would be of interest to family law specialists.
[Court Orders]The appeal application was dismissed. The Court found no error in law by failing to refer to s 117(7A) of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth).
No issue of procedural fairness arises – Application for leave to appeal dismissed – Appellant father ordered to pay costs.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Gender Identity Dysphoria
Judges: Bryant CJFinn JStrickland J
Background: The child concerned, “Jamie”, aged almost 11 years at the time of hearing, was diagnosed as having childhood gender identity disorder. At first instance, the parents were asking the court to authorise them to consent to treatment on behalf of Jamie, under the guidance of Jamie’s treating medical practitioners, for the administration of particular drugs designed to achieve suppression of certain hormones affecting the development of male features and particularly the onset of male puberty. The treatment, which occurs in two stages, comprises administration of puberty-suppressant hormones (stage one) and oestrogen (stage two), and is common to children who are diagnosed with this condition. The treatment would enable Jamie, born a male, to live in her affirmed sex as a female.
[Legal Issue]The first ground asserts that childhood gender identity disorder is not a special medical procedure which displaces the parental responsibility of the Appellants to decide upon the appropriate treatment for their child.
The second ground, in the alternative, asserts that the Applicant Mother and Applicant Father be authorised to consent to the following special medical procedures on behalf of their child, ... (“Jamie”), being (i) he administration of puberty suppressant hormones, and (ii) additional treatment of oestrogen as may be considered appropriate by Jamie’s treating Endocrinologist.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Order 1 of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Dessau on 28 March 2011 be set aside.
There be no order for costs.
Catchwords: Appeal, Gender Identity Dysphoria
Judges: Bryant CJFinn JStrickland J
Background: The child concerned, “Jamie”, aged almost 11 years at the time of hearing, was diagnosed as having childhood gender identity disorder. At first instance, the parents were asking the court to authorise them to consent to treatment on behalf of Jamie, under the guidance of Jamie’s treating medical practitioners, for the administration of particular drugs designed to achieve suppression of certain hormones affecting the development of male features and particularly the onset of male puberty. The treatment, which occurs in two stages, comprises administration of puberty-suppressant hormones (stage one) and oestrogen (stage two), and is common to children who are diagnosed with this condition. The treatment would enable Jamie, born a male, to live in her affirmed sex as a female.
[Legal Issue]The first ground asserts that childhood gender identity disorder is not a special medical procedure which displaces the parental responsibility of the Appellants to decide upon the appropriate treatment for their child.
The second ground, in the alternative, asserts that the Applicant Mother and Applicant Father be authorised to consent to the following special medical procedures on behalf of their child, ... (“Jamie”), being (i) he administration of puberty suppressant hormones, and (ii) additional treatment of oestrogen as may be considered appropriate by Jamie’s treating Endocrinologist.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Order 1 of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Dessau on 28 March 2011 be set aside.
There be no order for costs.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Finn JRyan JStrickland J
Background: A couple, known by the court as Mr Wallace and Ms Stelzer, met in 1998 at the Sydney club where Ms Stelzer worked soon after Mr Wallace split from his first wife. At the time, he was 51 and she was 38. They married seven years later and entered into a prenuptial agreement that Mr Wallace would pay Ms Stelzer $3.25m if the relationship failed within four years. It failed within two.
[Legal Issue]Mr Wallace tried to renege on their pre-nuptial (binding financial) agreement, arguing that the relevant legislation was unconstitutional because it was retrospective. He argued that his pre-nuptial agreement was signed before the 2010 amendments and so his agreement should be deemed invalid.
Mr Wallace also fought to have the pre-nuptial agreement deemed invalid, claiming that Ms Stelzer behaved fraudulently by making "false promises of love and desire for children".
He also said his lawyers did not give him adequate legal advice and make clear the pros and cons of the pre-nuptial agreement. He said that his lawyers had taken only minutes to sign it.
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court ruled the pre-nuptial agreement was binding and that the amended legislation "can have a retrospective operation which is constitutionally valid".
The woman who previously worked as a pole dancer is set to receive $3.25 million from her ex-husband after the Family Court ruled against his bid to have their pre-nuptial agreement overturned because of her "false promises".
The ruling means that there is much more certainty about the validity of pre-nuptial a
Catchwords: Appeal, Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Finn JRyan JStrickland J
Background: A couple, known by the court as Mr Wallace and Ms Stelzer, met in 1998 at the Sydney club where Ms Stelzer worked soon after Mr Wallace split from his first wife. At the time, he was 51 and she was 38. They married seven years later and entered into a prenuptial agreement that Mr Wallace would pay Ms Stelzer $3.25m if the relationship failed within four years. It failed within two.
[Legal Issue]Mr Wallace tried to renege on their pre-nuptial (binding financial) agreement, arguing that the relevant legislation was unconstitutional because it was retrospective. He argued that his pre-nuptial agreement was signed before the 2010 amendments and so his agreement should be deemed invalid.
Mr Wallace also fought to have the pre-nuptial agreement deemed invalid, claiming that Ms Stelzer behaved fraudulently by making "false promises of love and desire for children".
He also said his lawyers did not give him adequate legal advice and make clear the pros and cons of the pre-nuptial agreement. He said that his lawyers had taken only minutes to sign it.
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court ruled the pre-nuptial agreement was binding and that the amended legislation "can have a retrospective operation which is constitutionally valid".
The woman who previously worked as a pole dancer is set to receive $3.25 million from her ex-husband after the Family Court ruled against his bid to have their pre-nuptial agreement overturned because of her "false promises".
The ruling means that there is much more certainty about the validity of pre-nuptial a
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Notice to Appeal, Spousal Maintenance
Judges: Strickland J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Catchwords: Notice to Appeal, Spousal Maintenance
Judges: Strickland J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]