Finn J
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Gender Identity Dysphoria
Judges: Bryant CJFinn JStrickland J
Background: The child concerned, “Jamie”, aged almost 11 years at the time of hearing, was diagnosed as having childhood gender identity disorder. At first instance, the parents were asking the court to authorise them to consent to treatment on behalf of Jamie, under the guidance of Jamie’s treating medical practitioners, for the administration of particular drugs designed to achieve suppression of certain hormones affecting the development of male features and particularly the onset of male puberty. The treatment, which occurs in two stages, comprises administration of puberty-suppressant hormones (stage one) and oestrogen (stage two), and is common to children who are diagnosed with this condition. The treatment would enable Jamie, born a male, to live in her affirmed sex as a female.
[Legal Issue]The first ground asserts that childhood gender identity disorder is not a special medical procedure which displaces the parental responsibility of the Appellants to decide upon the appropriate treatment for their child.
The second ground, in the alternative, asserts that the Applicant Mother and Applicant Father be authorised to consent to the following special medical procedures on behalf of their child, ... (“Jamie”), being (i) he administration of puberty suppressant hormones, and (ii) additional treatment of oestrogen as may be considered appropriate by Jamie’s treating Endocrinologist.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Order 1 of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Dessau on 28 March 2011 be set aside.
There be no order for costs.
Catchwords: Appeal, Gender Identity Dysphoria
Judges: Bryant CJFinn JStrickland J
Background: The child concerned, “Jamie”, aged almost 11 years at the time of hearing, was diagnosed as having childhood gender identity disorder. At first instance, the parents were asking the court to authorise them to consent to treatment on behalf of Jamie, under the guidance of Jamie’s treating medical practitioners, for the administration of particular drugs designed to achieve suppression of certain hormones affecting the development of male features and particularly the onset of male puberty. The treatment, which occurs in two stages, comprises administration of puberty-suppressant hormones (stage one) and oestrogen (stage two), and is common to children who are diagnosed with this condition. The treatment would enable Jamie, born a male, to live in her affirmed sex as a female.
[Legal Issue]The first ground asserts that childhood gender identity disorder is not a special medical procedure which displaces the parental responsibility of the Appellants to decide upon the appropriate treatment for their child.
The second ground, in the alternative, asserts that the Applicant Mother and Applicant Father be authorised to consent to the following special medical procedures on behalf of their child, ... (“Jamie”), being (i) he administration of puberty suppressant hormones, and (ii) additional treatment of oestrogen as may be considered appropriate by Jamie’s treating Endocrinologist.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Order 1 of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Dessau on 28 March 2011 be set aside.
There be no order for costs.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Finn JRyan JStrickland J
Background: A couple, known by the court as Mr Wallace and Ms Stelzer, met in 1998 at the Sydney club where Ms Stelzer worked soon after Mr Wallace split from his first wife. At the time, he was 51 and she was 38. They married seven years later and entered into a prenuptial agreement that Mr Wallace would pay Ms Stelzer $3.25m if the relationship failed within four years. It failed within two.
[Legal Issue]Mr Wallace tried to renege on their pre-nuptial (binding financial) agreement, arguing that the relevant legislation was unconstitutional because it was retrospective. He argued that his pre-nuptial agreement was signed before the 2010 amendments and so his agreement should be deemed invalid.
Mr Wallace also fought to have the pre-nuptial agreement deemed invalid, claiming that Ms Stelzer behaved fraudulently by making "false promises of love and desire for children".
He also said his lawyers did not give him adequate legal advice and make clear the pros and cons of the pre-nuptial agreement. He said that his lawyers had taken only minutes to sign it.
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court ruled the pre-nuptial agreement was binding and that the amended legislation "can have a retrospective operation which is constitutionally valid".
The woman who previously worked as a pole dancer is set to receive $3.25 million from her ex-husband after the Family Court ruled against his bid to have their pre-nuptial agreement overturned because of her "false promises".
The ruling means that there is much more certainty about the validity of pre-nuptial a
Catchwords: Appeal, Binding Financial Agreement, Binding Financial Agreement, Pre-Nuptial Agreement
Judges: Finn JRyan JStrickland J
Background: A couple, known by the court as Mr Wallace and Ms Stelzer, met in 1998 at the Sydney club where Ms Stelzer worked soon after Mr Wallace split from his first wife. At the time, he was 51 and she was 38. They married seven years later and entered into a prenuptial agreement that Mr Wallace would pay Ms Stelzer $3.25m if the relationship failed within four years. It failed within two.
[Legal Issue]Mr Wallace tried to renege on their pre-nuptial (binding financial) agreement, arguing that the relevant legislation was unconstitutional because it was retrospective. He argued that his pre-nuptial agreement was signed before the 2010 amendments and so his agreement should be deemed invalid.
Mr Wallace also fought to have the pre-nuptial agreement deemed invalid, claiming that Ms Stelzer behaved fraudulently by making "false promises of love and desire for children".
He also said his lawyers did not give him adequate legal advice and make clear the pros and cons of the pre-nuptial agreement. He said that his lawyers had taken only minutes to sign it.
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court ruled the pre-nuptial agreement was binding and that the amended legislation "can have a retrospective operation which is constitutionally valid".
The woman who previously worked as a pole dancer is set to receive $3.25 million from her ex-husband after the Family Court ruled against his bid to have their pre-nuptial agreement overturned because of her "false promises".
The ruling means that there is much more certainty about the validity of pre-nuptial a
Court or Tribunal: Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Costs, De Facto Relationship
Judges: Bryant CJFaulks DCJFinn J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Catchwords: Appeal, Costs, De Facto Relationship
Judges: Bryant CJFaulks DCJFinn J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Equal Parenting Time, Equal Shared Parental Responsibility, Interim Parenting Orders, Parenting Orders, Shared Parenting, Sole Parental Responsibility, Substantial and Significant Time
Judges: Boland JBryant CJFinn J
Background: The parties were married in July 1996 and although there was a separation in December 1999 they finally separated in late May 2006. While there was some dispute as to the circumstances of the separation, the facts allowed the judge at first instance to find that the appellant father chose to leave the matrimonial home and bring the marriage to an end. Thereafter there was some dispute as to what happened in relation to the care of the children. Collier J recorded that the respondent mother asserted that after a period of time the parties reached an agreement and the appellant father commenced spending time with the children on each alternate weekend. The appellant father’s case was that the respondent mother removed the children from him and made it very difficult for him to have
[Legal Issue]This is an appeal by the father against a decision for interim orders.
In this case the Judge in the previous decision did not apply the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, as stipulated in the family law act, nor did he consider what was in the child's best interests, as listed in the primary and additional considerations in the family law act.
Instead the Judge applied the principle previously determined in Cowling v Cowling [1998] FamCA 19, commonly referred to as the "Status Quo". The principle of Status Quo determined that if a child was in a well-settled environment, the child's arrangements should not be altered.
As such, the Judge determined that in interim hearings, the Status Quo should be the prevailing principle, not what was determined to be in the
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court determined that the appeal was successful, and that:
(1) The presumption that an order for equal shared parental responsibility will be in the child’s best interests still applies in interim cases, even if neither party asks for such an order.
(2) Where that presumption is applied, the Court must still, at an interim hearing, consider the practicality of the child spending equal time with each of the parents under Section 65AA of the Act.
(3) Even wh
Catchwords: Appeal, Equal Parenting Time, Equal Shared Parental Responsibility, Interim Parenting Orders, Parenting Orders, Shared Parenting, Sole Parental Responsibility, Substantial and Significant Time
Judges: Boland JBryant CJFinn J
Background: The parties were married in July 1996 and although there was a separation in December 1999 they finally separated in late May 2006. While there was some dispute as to the circumstances of the separation, the facts allowed the judge at first instance to find that the appellant father chose to leave the matrimonial home and bring the marriage to an end. Thereafter there was some dispute as to what happened in relation to the care of the children. Collier J recorded that the respondent mother asserted that after a period of time the parties reached an agreement and the appellant father commenced spending time with the children on each alternate weekend. The appellant father’s case was that the respondent mother removed the children from him and made it very difficult for him to have
[Legal Issue]This is an appeal by the father against a decision for interim orders.
In this case the Judge in the previous decision did not apply the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, as stipulated in the family law act, nor did he consider what was in the child's best interests, as listed in the primary and additional considerations in the family law act.
Instead the Judge applied the principle previously determined in Cowling v Cowling [1998] FamCA 19, commonly referred to as the "Status Quo". The principle of Status Quo determined that if a child was in a well-settled environment, the child's arrangements should not be altered.
As such, the Judge determined that in interim hearings, the Status Quo should be the prevailing principle, not what was determined to be in the
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court determined that the appeal was successful, and that:
(1) The presumption that an order for equal shared parental responsibility will be in the child’s best interests still applies in interim cases, even if neither party asks for such an order.
(2) Where that presumption is applied, the Court must still, at an interim hearing, consider the practicality of the child spending equal time with each of the parents under Section 65AA of the Act.
(3) Even wh