Bryant CJ
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Divorce, Inheritance, Inheritance, Property, Property
Judges: Aldridge JBryant CJRyan J
Background: The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Western Australia heard an Appeal by a husband who argued that an inheritance received 4 years after separation should not be included in the property to be divided between him and his ex-wife. The parties were married for 8 years and were divorced in 2011.They had one child who was 5 years old at the time of separation. In 2014 the husband received an inheritance from his father’s estate. The wife commenced proceedings more than 3 years after separation and was granted the Court’s leave under Section 44 (3) of the Family Law Act to pursue a property settlement claim.
[Legal Issue]The central issue on appeal was whether the trial Judge erred by including the husband’s post separation inheritance within the parties’ property pool available for division. The husband argued that his inheritance should not be included in the pool because of the degree of “connection” or more to the point, the lack of connection, between the inheritance and the parties’ matrimonial relationship. The husband was unsuccessful in taking that position and his appeal was dismissed.
The Justices of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, Chief Justice Bryant, Justice Ryan and Justice Aldridge concluded that the Court retained a discretion as to how to approach the treatment of property acquired after separation.
Conversely in the case of Holland & Holland [2017] FamC
[Court Orders](1) The appeal against the orders made by Magistrate Calverley on 17 November 2016 is dismissed.
(2) The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or in default of agreement as assessed.
The husband was unsuccessful in excluding his post-separation inheritance from the asset pool. The trial judge assessed contributions as 65%/35% in the husband’s favour, which included a 10% adjustment to the wife for future needs.
No appealable error established – Appeal dismissed
Catchwords: Divorce, Inheritance, Inheritance, Property, Property
Judges: Aldridge JBryant CJRyan J
Background: The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Western Australia heard an Appeal by a husband who argued that an inheritance received 4 years after separation should not be included in the property to be divided between him and his ex-wife. The parties were married for 8 years and were divorced in 2011.They had one child who was 5 years old at the time of separation. In 2014 the husband received an inheritance from his father’s estate. The wife commenced proceedings more than 3 years after separation and was granted the Court’s leave under Section 44 (3) of the Family Law Act to pursue a property settlement claim.
[Legal Issue]The central issue on appeal was whether the trial Judge erred by including the husband’s post separation inheritance within the parties’ property pool available for division. The husband argued that his inheritance should not be included in the pool because of the degree of “connection” or more to the point, the lack of connection, between the inheritance and the parties’ matrimonial relationship. The husband was unsuccessful in taking that position and his appeal was dismissed.
The Justices of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, Chief Justice Bryant, Justice Ryan and Justice Aldridge concluded that the Court retained a discretion as to how to approach the treatment of property acquired after separation.
Conversely in the case of Holland & Holland [2017] FamC
[Court Orders](1) The appeal against the orders made by Magistrate Calverley on 17 November 2016 is dismissed.
(2) The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or in default of agreement as assessed.
The husband was unsuccessful in excluding his post-separation inheritance from the asset pool. The trial judge assessed contributions as 65%/35% in the husband’s favour, which included a 10% adjustment to the wife for future needs.
No appealable error established – Appeal dismissed
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Child Support, Departure Determination, extra-curricular activities, School Fees, Sole Parental Responsibility
Judges: Aldridge JBryant CJChief Justice Diana BryantCoates JJustice Michael KentJustice Murray AldridgeJustice Stephen CoatesKent J
Background: A divorced mother, known by her court appointed pseudonym as Ms Stewart, has sought an Order from the Court that her two children, one boy and one girl, upon reaching high school age, should be enrolled in two prestigious same-sex private schools, the son of which to follow in the father's family tradition, she claimed, and attend the father's and grandfather's alma mater. As the Federal Circuit Court heard the previous year prior the case being appealed to the Full Court of the Family Court, the estimated cost of the tuition fees alone, if both children attended private school, would be approximately $50,000 a year. The Court further heard that even without taking into account the extra expenses of a private education and probable fee increases, it would cost up to $300,000 in total to
[Legal Issue]In the original decision from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Justice Stephen Coates relied on the mother's financial capacity in determining as to whether this case had any merit, and consequently found that Ms Stewart had not established that the cost of private schooling would be affordable.
"The mother said she could afford 40 per cent of the fees, yet on her income, I do not see she has proven her case," he said.
He ruled that the children should attend a government high school, saying they would not be disadvantaged as the state provides "a capable education system".
The judge said the Stewarts' son would cope with not going to the private school "if the mother responsibly handles the situation for the child, even though such an order would be a great disappointment
[Court Orders](1) The application in an appeal filed by the appellant mother on 21 February 2017 is dismissed.
(2) The appeal is dismissed.
(3) The appellant mother pay the respondent father’s costs of and incidental to the appeal to be agreed, or failing agreement, to be assessed.
Catchwords: Appeal, Child Support, Departure Determination, extra-curricular activities, School Fees, Sole Parental Responsibility
Judges: Aldridge JBryant CJChief Justice Diana BryantCoates JJustice Michael KentJustice Murray AldridgeJustice Stephen CoatesKent J
Background: A divorced mother, known by her court appointed pseudonym as Ms Stewart, has sought an Order from the Court that her two children, one boy and one girl, upon reaching high school age, should be enrolled in two prestigious same-sex private schools, the son of which to follow in the father's family tradition, she claimed, and attend the father's and grandfather's alma mater. As the Federal Circuit Court heard the previous year prior the case being appealed to the Full Court of the Family Court, the estimated cost of the tuition fees alone, if both children attended private school, would be approximately $50,000 a year. The Court further heard that even without taking into account the extra expenses of a private education and probable fee increases, it would cost up to $300,000 in total to
[Legal Issue]In the original decision from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Justice Stephen Coates relied on the mother's financial capacity in determining as to whether this case had any merit, and consequently found that Ms Stewart had not established that the cost of private schooling would be affordable.
"The mother said she could afford 40 per cent of the fees, yet on her income, I do not see she has proven her case," he said.
He ruled that the children should attend a government high school, saying they would not be disadvantaged as the state provides "a capable education system".
The judge said the Stewarts' son would cope with not going to the private school "if the mother responsibly handles the situation for the child, even though such an order would be a great disappointment
[Court Orders](1) The application in an appeal filed by the appellant mother on 21 February 2017 is dismissed.
(2) The appeal is dismissed.
(3) The appellant mother pay the respondent father’s costs of and incidental to the appeal to be agreed, or failing agreement, to be assessed.
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Gender Identity Dysphoria
Judges: Bryant CJFinn JStrickland J
Background: The child concerned, “Jamie”, aged almost 11 years at the time of hearing, was diagnosed as having childhood gender identity disorder. At first instance, the parents were asking the court to authorise them to consent to treatment on behalf of Jamie, under the guidance of Jamie’s treating medical practitioners, for the administration of particular drugs designed to achieve suppression of certain hormones affecting the development of male features and particularly the onset of male puberty. The treatment, which occurs in two stages, comprises administration of puberty-suppressant hormones (stage one) and oestrogen (stage two), and is common to children who are diagnosed with this condition. The treatment would enable Jamie, born a male, to live in her affirmed sex as a female.
[Legal Issue]The first ground asserts that childhood gender identity disorder is not a special medical procedure which displaces the parental responsibility of the Appellants to decide upon the appropriate treatment for their child.
The second ground, in the alternative, asserts that the Applicant Mother and Applicant Father be authorised to consent to the following special medical procedures on behalf of their child, ... (“Jamie”), being (i) he administration of puberty suppressant hormones, and (ii) additional treatment of oestrogen as may be considered appropriate by Jamie’s treating Endocrinologist.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Order 1 of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Dessau on 28 March 2011 be set aside.
There be no order for costs.
Catchwords: Appeal, Gender Identity Dysphoria
Judges: Bryant CJFinn JStrickland J
Background: The child concerned, “Jamie”, aged almost 11 years at the time of hearing, was diagnosed as having childhood gender identity disorder. At first instance, the parents were asking the court to authorise them to consent to treatment on behalf of Jamie, under the guidance of Jamie’s treating medical practitioners, for the administration of particular drugs designed to achieve suppression of certain hormones affecting the development of male features and particularly the onset of male puberty. The treatment, which occurs in two stages, comprises administration of puberty-suppressant hormones (stage one) and oestrogen (stage two), and is common to children who are diagnosed with this condition. The treatment would enable Jamie, born a male, to live in her affirmed sex as a female.
[Legal Issue]The first ground asserts that childhood gender identity disorder is not a special medical procedure which displaces the parental responsibility of the Appellants to decide upon the appropriate treatment for their child.
The second ground, in the alternative, asserts that the Applicant Mother and Applicant Father be authorised to consent to the following special medical procedures on behalf of their child, ... (“Jamie”), being (i) he administration of puberty suppressant hormones, and (ii) additional treatment of oestrogen as may be considered appropriate by Jamie’s treating Endocrinologist.
[Court Orders]The appeal be allowed.
Order 1 of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Dessau on 28 March 2011 be set aside.
There be no order for costs.
Court or Tribunal: Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Costs, De Facto Relationship
Judges: Bryant CJFaulks DCJFinn J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Catchwords: Appeal, Costs, De Facto Relationship
Judges: Bryant CJFaulks DCJFinn J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Children
Judges: Bryant CJColeman JMay J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Catchwords: Appeal, Children
Judges: Bryant CJColeman JMay J
Background:
[Legal Issue]
[Court Orders]
Court or Tribunal: Full Court of the Family Court of Australia
Catchwords: Appeal, Equal Parenting Time, Equal Shared Parental Responsibility, Interim Parenting Orders, Parenting Orders, Shared Parenting, Sole Parental Responsibility, Substantial and Significant Time
Judges: Boland JBryant CJFinn J
Background: The parties were married in July 1996 and although there was a separation in December 1999 they finally separated in late May 2006. While there was some dispute as to the circumstances of the separation, the facts allowed the judge at first instance to find that the appellant father chose to leave the matrimonial home and bring the marriage to an end. Thereafter there was some dispute as to what happened in relation to the care of the children. Collier J recorded that the respondent mother asserted that after a period of time the parties reached an agreement and the appellant father commenced spending time with the children on each alternate weekend. The appellant father’s case was that the respondent mother removed the children from him and made it very difficult for him to have
[Legal Issue]This is an appeal by the father against a decision for interim orders.
In this case the Judge in the previous decision did not apply the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, as stipulated in the family law act, nor did he consider what was in the child's best interests, as listed in the primary and additional considerations in the family law act.
Instead the Judge applied the principle previously determined in Cowling v Cowling [1998] FamCA 19, commonly referred to as the "Status Quo". The principle of Status Quo determined that if a child was in a well-settled environment, the child's arrangements should not be altered.
As such, the Judge determined that in interim hearings, the Status Quo should be the prevailing principle, not what was determined to be in the
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court determined that the appeal was successful, and that:
(1) The presumption that an order for equal shared parental responsibility will be in the child’s best interests still applies in interim cases, even if neither party asks for such an order.
(2) Where that presumption is applied, the Court must still, at an interim hearing, consider the practicality of the child spending equal time with each of the parents under Section 65AA of the Act.
(3) Even wh
Catchwords: Appeal, Equal Parenting Time, Equal Shared Parental Responsibility, Interim Parenting Orders, Parenting Orders, Shared Parenting, Sole Parental Responsibility, Substantial and Significant Time
Judges: Boland JBryant CJFinn J
Background: The parties were married in July 1996 and although there was a separation in December 1999 they finally separated in late May 2006. While there was some dispute as to the circumstances of the separation, the facts allowed the judge at first instance to find that the appellant father chose to leave the matrimonial home and bring the marriage to an end. Thereafter there was some dispute as to what happened in relation to the care of the children. Collier J recorded that the respondent mother asserted that after a period of time the parties reached an agreement and the appellant father commenced spending time with the children on each alternate weekend. The appellant father’s case was that the respondent mother removed the children from him and made it very difficult for him to have
[Legal Issue]This is an appeal by the father against a decision for interim orders.
In this case the Judge in the previous decision did not apply the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, as stipulated in the family law act, nor did he consider what was in the child's best interests, as listed in the primary and additional considerations in the family law act.
Instead the Judge applied the principle previously determined in Cowling v Cowling [1998] FamCA 19, commonly referred to as the "Status Quo". The principle of Status Quo determined that if a child was in a well-settled environment, the child's arrangements should not be altered.
As such, the Judge determined that in interim hearings, the Status Quo should be the prevailing principle, not what was determined to be in the
[Court Orders]The Full Court of the Family Court determined that the appeal was successful, and that:
(1) The presumption that an order for equal shared parental responsibility will be in the child’s best interests still applies in interim cases, even if neither party asks for such an order.
(2) Where that presumption is applied, the Court must still, at an interim hearing, consider the practicality of the child spending equal time with each of the parents under Section 65AA of the Act.
(3) Even wh